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My interest in clashing views on the relationship of 
Islam and human rights came about as a result of unplanned 
encounters in Sudan. When I went to Sudan to conduct 
research on Islamization of the economy in 1984-85, I had 
no idea that discussions with Sudanese lawyers and human 
rights activists were about to change the course of my 
research. Discussions both during Nimeiri’s Islamization 
program and following his overthrow exposed me to the 
nefarious impact that Islamization as conceived by a 
thuggish dictator could have on human rights. In large 
measure, the Sudanese whom I encountered regarded Nimeiri’s 
version of Islamic law as a perversion of Islam, believing 
that Islam, correctly understood, supported their 
aspirations to enjoy the human rights set forth in 
international law. I was impressed that courageous 
opponents of Nimeiri’s Islamization were ready to risk 
their own lives to speak out to denounce the resulting 
injustices. One of the bravest was Mahmud Muhammad Taha, an 
Islamic reformer, whom Nimeiri executed shortly after my 
first trip to Khartoum, officially consigning him to death 
for “apostasy” but in reality retaliating for his bold 
condemnation of the human rights abuses being perpetrated 
in the guise of applying Islamic law. Widespread outrage 
over the judicial murder of Taha was one of the factors 
mobilizing the populace to revolt and overthrow Nimeiri in 
1985. Having confronted the gap between popular support for 
human rights and a dictator’s campaign to crush a restive 
citizenry under the rubric of applying Islamic law, I 
wanted to share what I had learned with others. 
I made an initial effort to explain the Sudanese human 
rights situation and how it confirmed the premises of human 
rights universalism in a 1986 talk criticizing Nimeiri’s 
Islamization program at one of the major U.S. centers of 
Middle Eastern studies. I amplified the discussion by 
comparisons with developments in other Middle Eastern 
countries. I also critiqued the diluted rights set forth in 
the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights. I   
called for differentiating Muslims’ religious beliefs from 
the political uses of Islam to rationalize oppression.  
I encountered incomprehension and hostility from the 
U.S. audience, most of whose members were convinced that 
criticizing a military dictator who claimed to be 
implementing Islamic law necessarily reflected attitudes 
that were Orientalist, neo-Imperialist, and disrespectful 
of the Islamic religion. Exacerbating the hostile reactions 
was the fact that my approach violated the canons of 
cultural relativism, then treated by most U.S. academics 
concerned with the Middle East as unimpeachable dogma. (The 
hold of cultural relativism has since then somewhat 
weakened.) As applied to human rights issues, proponents of 
cultural relativism classified international human rights 
law as an artifact of Western culture -- with the 
consequence that its application to Muslim societies 
involved judging them by inappropriate, alien criteria.  
  There was also an understandable tendency to refer 
back to the history of Imperialist incursions in the Middle 
East, in which complaints about the oppression of local 
rulers could be opportunistically invoked as a pretext to 
legitimize European invasions. Thus, the ideal of human 
rights universalism was being reflexively – and incorrectly 
-- associated with the old Western colonialist project and 
a mentality that saw Western domination of Muslim societies 
as both natural and beneficial. Since international law was 
assumed to be infected by a Western hegemonic ideology – a 
highly dubious assumption about a law that harshly and 
unequivocally condemns colonialism and that sanctifies the 
right of self-determination, any Westerner like myself who 
called for applying it in Muslim countries was imagined to 
be furthering neo-imperialist designs.   
   Furthermore, in the reactions of the audience members, 
one could perceive the influence of the binary vision of 
“the West” versus “the Orient” that is so typical of 
Orientalism, without their being conscious that treating 
these as oppositional pairs was tied to their own 
Orientalist tendencies.  They were ready to hurl 
“Orientalist” as an epithet to denigrate those making 
negative assessments of the human rights situations in 
Muslim countries, regardless of the quality and accuracy of 
the assessments.  At the same time, those accusing me of 
Orientalism were themselves caught in Orientalist 
stereotyping, imagining that “the natives” should not be 
covered by standards aimed at ensuring justice and equality 
– thereby aligning themselves with the colonialist 
mentality that likewise denied “the natives” justice and 
equality. The eminent Syrian philosopher Sadiq al-`Azm has 
decried the Orientalism inhering in such attitudes, in 
which Westerners imagine that Muslims cannot appreciate 
democratic freedoms and human rights, presuming that, as 
Muslims, they must be “eternally sealed within their own 
cultural totalities and/or permanently condemned to live 
lives within the confines of their ‘most authentic’ systems 
of beliefs and values.”1   
In any event, support for human rights universalism 
was confused with the Orientalist mentality dissected by 
Edward Said, without people taking into account the fact  
that Said himself was a human rights universalist who 
appreciated the emancipatory potential of human rights. The 
possibility of differentiating the cynical appropriation of 
human rights rhetoric for neo-Imperialist designs and the 
principled struggles of human rights activists to end 
oppression was not conceded, and the capacity of peoples 
around the globe to collaborate on the basis of their 
shared concern for the wellbeing of humanity was ruled out 
in advance. 
I noticed that not one of my critics could go beyond 
uninformed preconceptions and charges; none of them spoke 
on the basis of personal experience investigating human 
rights issues in Muslim countries, and none could explain 
with specific examples and logical reasoning why it was 
appropriate to strip people in Muslim countries of the 
human rights that they aspired to enjoy. A lack of 
familiarity with the U.N. human rights system was much in 
evidence in the comments made. Not realizing how U.N. human 
rights documents were constructed with input from countries 
around the world or how estranged the United States was 
from the international human rights system, these academics 
imagined that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and other instruments embodied distinctive U.S. 
values and priorities. Based on their preconceptions, they 
could not accept the fact that Middle Eastern Muslims 
figured among the more important contributors to 
formulating the International Bill of Human Rights.2 
                                                 
1 Sadik [sic] al-`Azm, “The Importance of Being Earnest 
About Salman Rushdie,” Die Welt des Islams, vol. 31 (1991), 
30-34. 
 
2 A recent study of Muslim input into the UN human rights 
principles has made an important contribution to expanding 
awareness of the debt that U.N. human rights system owes to 
delegates from Muslim countries. See Susan Waltz, 
“Universal Human Rights: The Contribution of Muslim 
States,” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 26 (2004), 799-844. 
Since I did have background in international law and 
since I was talking about what I had actually witnessed in 
Khartoum and was reflecting discussions with knowledgeable 
Sudanese, I was confident that my perspectives were on firm 
ground.  I felt moved to correct the misapprehensions that 
stood in the way of grasping the politics of human rights 
in Muslim countries. I committed myself to what I 
originally assumed would be a short-term project of 
explaining the implications of the arguments that Muslims 
necessarily stood outside the international human rights 
system and that their rights had to be set according to 
distinctive “Islamic” standards.  I sought to encourage 
people to examine more critically the political uses of 
Islam to justify oppression.  I aimed to draw attention to 
how Muslims supportive of human rights found congruity 
between Islamic values and the principles of international 
law, believing that as Muslims they did not have to choose 
between their religion and human rights.  
   I realized that I needed to counter the tendency to 
treat Islam as a monolith. I had to explain how Muslims’ 
wildly differing stances on whether Islam constituted an 
obstacle to human rights might reflect a variety of 
competing strains in Islamic thought and how they often 
tied in directly  with local politics. Using examples from 
official statements and actual human rights records, I 
sought to demonstrate how in cases where Islam was 
controlled by governments, the official “Islams” had to be 
understood as expressions of state policy, not as 
expressions of immutable Islamic doctrine. Feeling that 
people too often overlooked the central role of the nation-
state, a Western model of government adopted by all Muslim 
countries, I stressed that national politics – not Islamic 
culture -- lay behind state sponsored deviations from 
international human rights law. All this meant that the 
cultural relativists’ conviction that attacking 
governmental rights policies was the same thing as 
attacking Islamic culture was misguided.  
  Although my own research has concentrated on the 
politics of human rights in the Middle East, because of my 
interest in how local particularisms are invoked to resist 
international law, I have extended my work to critique U.S. 
policies affecting international human rights law, which 
leave the United States deeply estranged from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
international system.  U.S. official views on many human 
rights issues exhibit the same insistence on the 
proposition that local law overrides international human 
rights law that one finds in many Muslim countries, and 
certain U.S. policies are becoming increasingly aligned 
with those of Muslim countries.3   
Knowing that my work was in a controversial area, I 
tried to make sure that it was based on a firm foundation 
of careful investigation and analysis. I sought to learn as 
much as I could about all sides of the issues I was 
covering, doing extensive research in a wide variety of 
relevant sources. I did not allow my initial preconceptions 
to dictate my conclusions; I second guessed my own 
assumptions as I expanded my knowledge of the subjects that 
I was researching. (I had already shown my readiness to 
rethink my positions when, after discussions in Khartoum, I 
myself corrected some cultural relativist misconceptions 
that I had initially harbored.) I exerted myself to provide 
in depth and fully documented scholarly assessments and 
comparisons of the ways that governments, politicians and 
diplomats, ideologues, lawyers, religious leaders and 
institutions, intellectuals, and academics had addressed 
the significance of Islam in relation to human rights 
issues. Recognizing that people tended to make casual 
generalizations about human rights without actually 
studying carefully the applicable provisions of 
international human rights instruments, I decided to remedy 
this by including detailed examinations and comparisons of 
international human rights provisions with the 
significantly altered versions offered in so-called Islamic 
human rights schemes.  
  Distinctions between the Islamic tradition and the way 
it is reworked by the modern nation state for its political 
objectives are essential to understanding my work on Islam 
and human rights.  The modern nation state is now 
ubiquitous in the Middle East, and it has had great impact 
on the way laws ostensibly derived from Islam are 
                                                 
3 See the publications listed below in note 35-37 and the 
forthcoming chapter on how the second Bush administration 
has allied itself with Muslim countries in fighting human 
rights dealing with children, women, and sexuality -- Ann 
Elizabeth Mayer “The Internationalization of Religiously 
Based Resistance to International Human Rights Law,” to be 
published in a volume entitled Global Justice and the 
Bulwarks of Localism: Human Rights in Context. 
 
formulated. My analyses of human rights issues build on my 
earlier studies assessing state-sponsored Islamization 
programs, concluding that they produced selective and 
highly politicized versions of Islamic principles. As I 
compared various Islamization programs, I noted a pattern 
of the vast and complex Islamic jurisprudential heritage 
becoming winnowed into a few principles reflecting the 
agendas of ruling elites.4  I found that the results of 
state-sponsored Islamization programs were more a function 
of politics than the revival of Islamic tradition. How 
Islam is being used as a governmental rationale for human 
rights violations similarly turns out to be a function of 
state-centric politics.5  This political dimension of my 
assessments and my focus on state policy – easily 
distinguishable from the Islamic tradition per se -- are 
regularly ignored by polemicists who are determined to 
depoliticize the way Islam is deployed to serve the agendas 
of those in control of the state. 
  My objective was to make my philosophical orientation 
in support of human rights transparent, the steps in my 
reasoning carefully outlined, and my documentation 
comprehensive. (On this last, have sometimes been thwarted 
by editors who insist on cutting out many of my examples 
and quotations and require me to excise most footnotes, 
finding the scope of my documentation excessive.)  My hope 
was that, regardless of whether readers decided to agree 
                                                 
4 See e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Libyan Legislation in 
Defense of Arabo-Islamic Sexual Mores,” The American 
Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 28, no. 2 (Spring 1980), 
287-313; “Islam and the State,” Cardozo Law Review, vol. 
12, nos. 3-4 (1991), 1015-56; "The Shari`a: A Methodology 
or a Body of Substantive Rules?" in Islamic Law and 
Jurisprudence, Nicholas Heer, ed.(Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1990), 177-198; “The Fundamentalist 
Impact on Law, Politics, and Constitutions in Iran, 
Pakistan and the Sudan,” in Fundamentalism and the State:  
Remaking Polities, Economics, and Militance, Martin Marty 
and Scott Appleby, eds., (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), 110-51. 
5 See e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Shifting Grounds for 
Challenging the Authority of International Human Rights 
Law: Religion as a Malleable and Politicized Pretext for 
Governmental Noncompliance with Human Rights,” in Human 
Rights with Modesty: The Problem of Universalism, Andras 
Sajo, ed., (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), 349-74.    
 
with my final conclusions, they could trust my expositions 
and not worry about being misled by the kinds of 
disinformation that one finds in shoddy or tendentious 
accounts masquerading as scholarship.         
My perspective was, as I frankly acknowledged, that of 
a supporter of the international standards and a member of 
groups committed to the proposition that human rights must 
be universally applied and respected. I know that this 
means that some will object that, in consequence, I cannot 
claim the objectivity that they think is called for. In my 
defense, I can say that, since I have been candid about my 
belief in human rights universality, if there is a bias, it 
should be one that readers can readily take into account. 
Moreover, there are problems with insisting that scholars 
should be neutral on sensitive contemporary human rights 
issues. Should we really demand that, as a precondition for 
writing about human rights, people be neutral on issues 
like torture of detainees, massacres of innocent civilians, 
harsh persecutions of dissidents, or laws treating adult 
women as children subject to male chastisement?  Do people 
perform better as scholars in the human rights domain if 
they lack consciences or if they have no empathy for the 
plight of the oppressed?  I think that for human rights 
scholarship to be valuable, it need not eschew a point of 
view on contested issues; what it should do is to try to 
provide valid insights into problems that come from 
thorough research, sound methods, and thoughtful analysis.   
In any event, I was pleased over the years to see some 
of the scholars who had been my harshest critics at that 
initial 1986 talk subsequently change opinions and become 
strong supporters of human rights for people in the Muslim 
world.  Alas, I was later to encounter a whole new phalanx 
of critics in the form of polemicists who were prepared to 
deploy any tactics, regardless of how dishonest and 
unsavory these might be, in their efforts to discredit any 
analyses that supported human rights universalism and 




Characteristics of frivolous and polemical human rights 
critiques  
  
Those of us who dedicate ourselves to producing 
serious scholarship on human rights issues in Muslim 
societies have every reason to want to be meticulous. When 
we see peoples’ welfare and even their survival 
jeopardized, we feel a powerful incentive to work hard to 
ensure that our assessments can stand up to critical 
scrutiny.  Since we inevitably confront hostile forces that 
are determined to discredit our analyses, we struggle to 
ensure their soundness -- in the hope that, over time, our 
careful work will lead to our analyses being given proper 
weight. Our task grows harder with the emergence of a 
contingent of polemicists determined to muddle analyses of 
human rights by disseminating frivolous, pseudo-scholarly 
“critiques,” misrepresenting the nature of the issues in 
the controversies about Islam and human rights and 
misleading readers about the character of the secondary 
literature.  Like email spam clogging one’s in boxes, this 
pseudo-scholarship takes up a great deal of space and 
creates the need for people to devote time to the 
evaluations needed to distinguish what is valuable from 
what is spam. 
 The people characterized here as polemicists are not 
scholars who engage in the normal disputation about real 
controversies and who criticize publications based on their 
problematic contents, which would be entirely legitimate.  
One expects and should welcome criticisms that expose flaws 
and problems and that can lead to improvements and advances 
in knowledge. However, no benefit whatsoever comes from 
“critiques” launched by persons who merely hope to score 
political points with certain constituencies by 
irresponsibly making accusations that they know are 
unfounded. (I am assuming those being designated as 
polemicists are not so dim, so confused that they cannot 
actually distinguish accurate statements from ones having 
no basis in fact.) Certain polemicists are so addicted to 
launching aggressive attacks that they invent battles based 
on utterly specious pretexts.  In their modus operandi, 
they are much like the second Bush Administration, which 
attacked and invaded Iraq on the completely spurious 
pretext that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction 
that it was about to use, repeating this lie many times in 
many forums, heedless of its falsehood. Obviously, 
President George W. Bush and the neo-con contingent calling 
for military aggression were eager to attack Iraq for other 
reasons, but the supposed threat posed by Saddam’s WMDs was 
relied on as the official rationale. In much the same way, 
the polemicists’ attacks on my human rights scholarship do 
not relate to what I have ever written or said, but rest 
instead on the basis of allegations as far-fetched as the 
official U.S. charges that Saddam harbored WMDs.    
Understanding the relationship between Islam and human 
rights is an important topic, but the prospects for such 
understanding are set back when polemicists insist on 
operating on their own rigid, ill-founded preconceptions 
and stubbornly refuse to adjust their thinking on the basis 
of evidence showing their deficiencies. Unsettled by 
propositions that challenge their often naïve stereotypes, 
they deploy distortions, counterfactual assertions, and 
base insinuations to discredit scholarship that cannot be 
squeezed into their intellectual procrustean beds. Unable 
to produce reasoned analyses, they resort to unfounded 
accusations and distortions – or even to outright lies – in 
order to “prove” their points. The “critiques” coming from 
such polemical ventures may masquerade as human rights 
scholarship, but they represent its antithesis.  Since 
these polemicists rely on spurious pretexts for taking the 
offensive, their “critiques” are obviously motivated by 
reasons other than the advancement of knowledge. Since I do 
take the advancement of knowledge to be the whole purpose 
of scholarship, I think it worth spending some time to cast 
light on their tactics.    
  In the areas that I write on, I observe that the 
hostility of polemicists tends to be provoked by analyses 
that pass negative judgments on the human rights deficits 
in Muslim societies, using international human rights law 
to judge these. Such analyses are categorized – wrongly -- 
as the misuse of quintessentially Western standards to 
denigrate Islamic culture. Criticism coming from a non-
Muslim in the West will be said to involve using 
inappropriate Western standards to judge Muslim societies; 
if coming from a Muslim, criticism will be dismissed as a 
manifestation of cultural alienation or the author’s 
mindless aping of Western attitudes.  Thus, I have had to 
become accustomed to being slurred by polemicists, who 
insist that my calling for protecting Muslims’ human rights 
means I am using Western standards to cast aspersions on 
Islam and am engaging in a blameworthy attempt to establish 
Western superiority.  
    A classic example of this kind of polemical attack can 
be seen in a supposed “critique” of my work authored by one 
Shamsheer Ali, which is replete with false accusations. As 
with most other such pseudo-scholarly “critiques” of my 
publications, Ali’s is studded with footnotes in hopes that 
readers will believe that it has documentary support. In 
reality, the footnotes are specious, mere decorative 
elements adorning a tirade lacking any research basis.6   
Alas, he has many emulators. 
 
 




 In some milieus attacking human rights universalism 
offers a respectable way for pressing opinions that, upon 
inspection, turn out to be reactionary.  Where women’s 
international human rights are concerned, polemicists 
opposed to allowing Muslim women equality in rights have a 
field day. Unwilling to make candid acknowledgments of 
their own hostility towards women’s equality in rights, 
they re-imagine Muslim societies as feminism-free zones -- 
as if being Muslim was tantamount to having an abhorrence 
of feminism. They refuse to acknowledge the voices of the 
growing contingent of Muslim feminists, who have 
outspokenly and courageously fought for equality. They lump 
Muslim women together, treating them as a species of 
subhumans united in their willingness to being denied basic 
freedoms, all in the guise of fidelity to “Islam.” A 
mindset that treasures preserving an Islamic identity over 
all other values and a natural hostility to the supposedly 
alien “Western” values of human rights are imputed to all 
Muslim women – except, of course, for those women deemed to 
be cultural traitors.    
                                                 
6 See Shamsheer Ali, “Review Article: Misguided Theorizing 
and Application,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 
19, no. 2 (1999), 299-320.  Among other things, Ali accuses 
me of extolling secular liberal culture as being superior 
to other cultures (p. 300) when I make no claims whatsoever 
about any such cultural superiority, of being “boastful 
that human rights are a unique product of Western 
liberalism”(p. 301) — citing to a publication where no such 
claim is being made, and of treating human rights law as 
practiced in U.S. courts as normative(p. 313) – when U.S. 
courts fail to apply international human rights law, a 
failing that I have repeatedly deplored.  I was afforded an 
opportunity to respond in Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Misguided 
Interpretation: Ann Elizabeth Mayer’s Response to Shamsheer 
Ali’s Review Article,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 
vol. 20 (2000), 181-84.  
  Among supporters of the Islamist project one finds 
ideologues who combine elements of Marxism, traditionally 
hostile to civil and political rights, with Islamist 
apologetics.  In a quixotic decision, the feminist journal 
SIGNS, which would hardly publish an article by a Christian 
fundamentalist like James Dobson demanding that U.S. 
women’s rights be determined by Biblical standards, felt 
comfortable publishing an article by Anouar Majid, who 
calls for Muslim women to defer to Islamic tradition and 
who portrays Iran’s Islamization program in the most 
favorable light.7  
   As part of his support for Islamist strictures affecting 
women, Majid denounces women’s international human rights 
as a Western imperialist plot that can have no legitimacy 
in Muslim societies, linking this to his condemnation of 
the predations of global capitalism. Denying the legitimacy 
of concerns for setbacks to women’s rights under Iran’s 
Islamization program, which he sees as having “liberated” 
Iranian women, Majid scoffs at concerns for women’s human 
rights as “a new form of orientalism” that equates “re-
Islamization” with a retreat “into a medieval 
obscurantism.”8  He speaks of a failure to chronicle the 
“female affirmation” by Islamist groups such as the Muslim 
Brothers, suggesting that this is the fault of “dominating 
currents of Western feminism,” “orientalist legacies,” and 
liberal bourgeois values such as “a deshistoricized notion 
of human rights and an implicit acceptance of the bourgeois 
political apparatus as a reliable mechanism for negotiating 
the grievances of the exploited.”9 The actual records of 
discriminatory treatment of women after “re-Islamization” 
in countries like Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Sudan are 
conveniently ignored.  
   Although indicating his negative assessment of my 
positions on human rights, Majid is more offended by the 
idea that a Muslim woman would dare appeal to international 
human rights law. Having noted that the prominent Moroccan 
feminist Fatima Mernissi is a strong supporter of women’s 
human rights, Majid admonishes her that a feminist movement 
that calls for civil rights “in the Islamic world today 
dismisses the weight of tradition and culture,” and he also 
faults it for discouraging resistance to Westernization.10 
                                                 
7 See Anouar Majid,“The Politics of Feminism in Islam,” 
SIGNS, vol. 23 (Winter 1998), 321-61. 
8 Ibid., 340.   
9 Ibid., 339. 
10 Ibid., 345.   
That is, a feminist like Mernissi, a Muslim woman raised in 
a traditional Moroccan harem environment, who rebels 
against what supporters of patriarchy claim are sacred 
rules requiring women’s submission, is no more than an 
agent of Western influence. Unlike the doctrines fashioned 
by male interpreters who preach women’s duty to defer to 
discriminatory rules – something that Majid implicitly 
accepts as truly Islamic, Majid does not bother to examine 
Mernissi’s enlightened feminist readings of Islamic 
requirements, these being effectively dismissed as mere 
kowtowing to Western ideas.   
  Deploying Marxist concepts in his attempts to defend 
Iran’s reactionary policies on women, Majid associates 
Iran’s rules enforcing Islamic dress for women with the 
struggle against Westernization and the global neocolonial 
order. That is, as Majid portrays it, the regime’s policies 
of stripping women of rights is not a case of reactionary 
clerics imposing hejab as part of a regime of stripping 
women of rights and freedoms; the hejab is a weapon in the 
struggle against global capitalism. He does not try to 
explain how Iranian women wearing chadors would keep global 
capitalism at bay when the same clerics who impose such 
dress on women are fighting determinedly to gain Iran’s 
entrée into the WTO, the centerpiece of the global 
capitalist system.  
  I have critiqued Majid’s attempts to make his 
endorsement of reactionary Islamist policies on women seem 
to be animated by progressive concerns, pointing out among 
other things how he ignores the manifestations of hunger 
for human rights among the populations of Muslim countries, 
how he writes around and suppresses the negative 
implications of Islamist policies affecting women, and how 
his insistence that women must defer any claims for human 
rights until the achievement of self-determination for 
“peoples” at some uncertain future date means that women 
are being consigned to having their aspirations for 
equality endlessly deferred.11   
                                                 
11 See Ann Elizabeth Mayer,“Comment on Majid’s ‘The Politics 
of Feminism in Islam’,” SIGNS, vol. 23 (Winter 1998), 369-
77. Regrettably, my response was written to an earlier 
draft of his article than the one actually appearing in 
print. At the last minute, an altered version of Majid’s 
original article was inserted, allowing him to tone down 
his effusions of enthusiasm for Islamism and Iran’s Islamic 
Revolution  In consequence of the last minute alterations 
and the shortness of the time I had to rewrite, my page 
  The Iranian human rights lawyer Shirin Ebadi 
represents the kind of Muslim woman who – according to the 
world views of people like Majid -- should not exist. 
Ebadi, a believing Muslim and a feminist, is an outspoken 
critic of U.S. policies at the same time that she condemns 
Iran’s discriminatory treatment of women. She is a perfect 
exemplar of how Muslims in Muslim countries can insist that 
Islam is consonant with human rights, rejecting the 
policies stripping their fellow Muslims of human rights 
because they do not accept that Islam requires deviating 
from international human rights. Thus, Ebadi has fought 
hard to roll back the discriminatory laws affecting women 
that Iran’s clerical rulers insist are mandated by Islamic 
requirements.  These included laws that removed Ebadi from 
her judgeship on the grounds of sex-stereotyping that 
proposed that all women were unfit for holding judicial 
office.  Barring women from all judicial offices embodies 
the kind of blatantly sexist and reactionary views that 
polemicists like Majid prefer not to discuss in their 
attempts to rehabilitate the image of Iran’s ruling 
theocracy.  
   Ebadi’s case proves that human rights universality is 
a two-edged sword; it can be used to critique human rights 
violations whether they occur in East or West under an 
Islamic rubric or in Western countries. Ebadi dislikes 
wearing the “Islamic” uniform imposed by Iran’s ruling 
clerics and dresses in Western style when she leaves Iran. 
Thus, she was bare-headed when she received the news of her 
Nobel Prize in Paris in October 2003 and also when she went 
to Oslo in December for the Nobel Prize ceremony. However, 
as a true supporter of human rights universality, Ebadi did 
not limit herself to fighting against Iran’s discriminatory 
treatment of women, like its coercive official Islamic 
dress rules.  Having a mastery of international human 
rights law and following a coherent universalist model of 
human rights, Ebadi used her time in the spotlight to 
insist that women should be free to choose whether or not 
to cover their hair – and that this principle applied not 
only in Iran but in Europe, as well. During her October 
stay in Paris, Ebadi noted the debates on the French plan 
to ban Muslim students from wearing headscarves in schools.  
Believing in freedom of religion as a principle that 
crosses national frontiers, Ebadi sided with the Muslim 
women who protested the ban on headscarves in French 
                                                                                                                                                 
references and quotations do not always correlate with the 
altered text. 
schools, asserting that she was equally opposed to the 
French ban on the headscarf and to the Iranian imposition 
of the headscarf, that both were unacceptable from a human 
rights perspective.12  It is cases like hers that 
demonstrate how believing Muslims who are versed in 
international human rights law do appreciate the need to 
have consistent standards and and how they press 
universalist positions that will be anathema to those 
preaching the doctrine that human rights are “too Western” 




Discussing Human Rights in an Era of Islamophobia  
 
 Given the current international situation, there is a 
great deal of ambient “noise” that interferes with 
successful communication on issues of Islam and human 
rights. It is vital to distinguish well-documented and fair 
criticisms that reflect rigorous and consistent 
applications of international standards from a very 
different phenomenon -- the selective appropriation of 
human rights by Western governments to justify their 
political and economic encroachments or the cynical 
deployment of human rights rhetoric by Islamophobes.  The 
motives behind scholarship that endeavors to render 
intelligible complex developments in Middle Eastern 
societies can be confused with the motives of actors in the 
drama of expanding U.S. hegemony in the Middle East.  U.S. 
ambitions to impose a Pax Americana on the Middle East have 
mushroomed since September 11, 2001, raising the “noise” 
level, which was already confusing for many observers.  
Today one sees Western politicians -- like members of the 
second Bush administration -- who cynically exploit human 
rights as a tool to bludgeon uncooperative countries into 
submission or to justify neo-imperialist crusades.  The 
blatant double standards of the Bush Administration, in 
which a country like Iran is demonized and more cooperative 
or subservient countries that are human rights hells -- 
like Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Uzbekistan -- 
are treated leniently, naturally provoke disgust.   
   Those perceiving the outlines of a neo-colonialist plot 
in efforts to secure the universality of human rights might 
                                                 
12 See e.g., Pierre-Henry Deshayes, “Laurels but no head 
scarf: Shirin Ebadi in Oslo to receive Nobel Peace Prize,” 
Agence France Presse, Dec. 8, 2003. 
point to statements like those made on September 26, 2001, 
by Italy’s Prime Minister Berlusconi, a strong supporter of 
U.S. intervention in the Middle East. This neo-fascist 
official proclaimed Western civilization superior to that 
of Islam – in part based on the West’s advances in human 
rights – and called for the West to “occidentalize” the 
globe, as if this would be to the benefit of non-Western 
societies.  Among his comments were: 
 
We should be confident of the superiority of our 
civilization, which consists of a value system that has 
given people widespread prosperity in those countries that 
embrace it, and guarantees respect for human rights and 
religion. This respect certainly does not exist in Islamic 
countries.13 
 
However, the neo-fascist Berlusconi has no stature 
whatsoever in the human rights domain, and his enthusiasm 
for Western Imperialist ventures in Muslim countries is 
irreconcilable with fundamental principles of international 
law supporting self-determination and anti-colonialism.  
Wrongly assuming that ideas like Berlusconi’s are typical 
of human rights activists, persons skeptical about claims 
of human rights universality may envisage a grim outcome of 
the struggle on behalf of human rights universality and may 
project that, when non-Western societies lie prostrate 
after being overwhelmed by the ravages of Western culture, 
they will be incapable of resisting Western economic and 
military predations.  In reality, it is the lack of human 
rights that, in combination with other factors, makes so 
many Muslim countries particularly vulnerable to outside 
pressures. 
     More “noise” is engendered by Western religious 
leaders like Franklin Graham and political pundits like Ann 
Coulter who demonize Islam and call for Muslims to be 
converted to Christianity, assuming that Islamic 
civilization is barbaric and backward.  One also encounters 
journalistic proponents of rank Islamophobia, like the 
Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, who authors poisonous 
diatribes against Muslims and their faith. To their “noise” 
is added the babbling of supposed “experts” on Islam like 
the pseudonymous “Ibn Warraq” who is furiously hostile to 
                                                 
13 Stephen Erlanger, “West superior to Islam world, says 
Italian PM,” NY Times News Service, Sept. 28, 2001. 
 http://www.geocities.com/dapat_tapatt/west.html 
 
Islam and who wages campaigns to defame it, blaming Islam 
for the ills of Muslim societies – including the dismal 
human rights situations that one finds there.14 I need not 
dwell on my quarrels with “Ibn Warraq,” since the person 
hiding behind this pseudonym has given the world ample 
reason to question his evaluative capacities via his 
writings, most particularly his recent assault on the 
deceased Edward Said, whom he accuses of being “the most 
influential exponent” of the philosophical trend that 
produced “Islamic terrorism.” 15 In an interesting twist, 
the Islamophobic “Ibn Warraq” attacks me, expressing 
disgust at what he calls my “desperate attempts to 
exonerate Islam.”16 That is, while polemicists with 
apologetic and cultural relativist agendas condemn me for 
negative characterizations of Islam, a polemicist on the 
opposite side who is aiming to denigrate Islam finds the 
distinctions that I draw between Islam and the political 
uses of Islam objectionable.  
  Such background “noise” frequently disposes people to 
make too casually the assumption that all critical 
appraisals by Westerners of human rights deficits in Muslim 
societies must be animated by hostility towards Islam 
                                                 
14 See Ibn Warraq, Why I Am Not A Muslim (Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus, 1995). 
15 See Ibn Warraq, “The man who gave us the intellectual 
argument for Muslim rage dies,” Wall Street Journal, 
September 29, 2003.  In hurling this outrageous accusation 
at Said, Ibn Warraq reveals perfectly both his level of 
intelligence and the nature of his political engagement.  
Blaming Said for creating the philosophical basis for 
Islamic terrorism is patently absurd. However, this has not 
deterred U.S. neo-conservatives, who have reasons for 
wanting to discredit Said’s tough critiques of U.S. 
policies, from smearing him as “the Profesor of Terror.”  
An important essay by Tony Judt has reminded us of Said’s 
actual views, which precluded recourse to political 
violence.  See Tony Judt, “The Rootless Cosmopolitan,” The 
Nation, July 19, 2004, 
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040719&s=judt  
 
16 Not greatly concerned with coherence, “Ibn Warraq” has 
endeavored to persuade his readers that my work supports 
his view that Islam is the great obstacle to human rights 
in Muslim countries while at the same time decrying my 
supposedly “bad arguments.”  See Ibn Warraq, Why I Am Not a 
Muslim, 190-91. 
and/or by support for the designs of Western neo-
imperialism.  It is vital to differentiate well-founded 
critical evaluations of the ideologized Islam that is 
deployed both by governments and by reactionary Islamists 
as the pretext for oppression from a different phenomenon, 
Islamophobia – attacks on Islam per se and diatribes 
designed to establish that Islamic civilization is 
defective and barbaric in comparison with its Western 
counterpart. The latter approach entails denigrating 
Islamic religion and culture on the basis of hostile 
stereotyping and ethnocentric presumptions of Western 
superiority, whereas the former condemns specific political 
programs for their non-conformity with international law, 
using standards that likewise apply to judge Western 
shortcomings.  Without the right distinctions, discussions 
of human rights issues in Muslim countries become 
hopelessly confused, with non-issues becoming elevated to 
the status of the issues, diverting attention from human 
rights problems that cry out for attention.   
   
 
 
A Human Rights Critique out of Lewis Carroll’s World 
 
   The following dissection of John Strawson’s grossly 
misleading “critique” of my work should serve as an 
instructive illustration of how what I write is traduced by 
people who are committed to discrediting scholarship that 
conflicts with their convictions that human rights do not 
belong in Muslim societies.  I have singled John Strawson 
out for particular attention, because he has been most 
assiduous in purveying gross mischaracterizations of my 
work in one publication after another, all the while 
maintaining the pretense of being engaged in scholarship. I 
propose here to account for John Strawson’s bizarre 
“reading” by assuming that he owes an intellectual debt to 
Lewis Carroll, although one might well suspect that other 
motives are at play. Strawson’s criticisms seem animated by 
the Mock Turtle’s version of Arithmetic – “Ambition, 
Distraction, Uglification and Derision.” I have already 
published one short response to some of Strawson’s 
outlandish charges.17  Although I can only respond here to a 
fraction of his strange accusations, I hope that, once 
alerted to Strawson’s tactics, readers will be prepared to 
                                                 
17 See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “A Rebuttal,” Arab Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 20 n.1 (Winter 1998), 95-97. 
dissect other dimensions of his oeuvre and to enjoy his 
faux-scholarly “critiques” in the manifestly unserious 
spirit in which they were written.  By grasping the 
patterns in Strawson’s misrepresentations, they will also 
be prepared to identify the spam-like disinformation being 
purveyed by other authors sharing the same mindset.   
  Strawson, operating in his through-the-looking-glass 
mode, pretends that my Islam and Human Rights book has a 
thesis that is diametrically opposed to the one that it 
actually puts forth, writing: “Mayer concludes her book 
with an explanation of her thesis that Islam contains a 
‘culture based resistance to rights.’”18 Readers should 
contrast Strawson’s fabrication with the book’s actual 
conclusion, emphasizing that, despite the regular recourse 
to Islam as a cover, political factors – not culture – lie 
behind state-sponsored Islamic human rights schemes.  I 
stress that Islam and its associated culture are not the 
problem: 
 
Their Islamic pedigrees are dubious . . .the pattern of 
diluted rights in the Islamic human rights schemes examined 
here should not be ascribed to peculiar features of Islam 
or its inherent incompatibility with human rights.  
Instead, these diluted rights should be seen as part of a 
broader phenomenon of attempts by elites -- the 
beneficiaries of undemocratic and hierarchical systems -- 
to legitimize their opposition to human rights by appealing 
to supposedly distinctive cultural traditions.19   
 
In John Strawson’s gross misrepresentation of my conclusion 
one sees his “method” for composing a “critique” in a 
nutshell: Deliberately ignore what another scholar has 
written, invent obnoxious or ignorant stances that conflict 
with the points of view actually expressed, falsely 
attribute these stances to the scholar, and then proceed to 
                                                 
18 John Strawson, Encountering Islamic Law, 
www.geocities.com/paklawreview/strawson1.html 
[hereinafter Strawson, EIL, Pakistan] 
19 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights, Tradition 
and Politics, 2d ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 177. I 
should note that Strawson refers to both the first edition, 
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights, Tradition and 
Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1991), and second edition of 
this book, not to the third edition, Ann Elizabeth Mayer, 
Islam and Human Rights, Tradition and Politics, 3rd ed. 
(Boulder: Westview, 1999). 
“critique” the scholar for the false imputations. One also 
sees the characteristics that mark his “critiques” as 
exercises in pseudo-scholarship. Rather than confess that 
he is engaged in a polemical endeavor, Strawson includes 
some quotations, offers some footnotes, and writes in the 
tone of an academic perturbed by the deficiencies that he 
pretends that he has discovered. John Strawson’s scholarly 
masquerade is one reason why a riposte is called for; 
unwary readers, particularly unwary students, could be 
deceived into thinking that there actually are factual 
bases for his Mock Turtle-style disquisitions on my human 
rights publications.  
Being disinclined to consider the importance of 
political dynamics within Muslim countries, John Strawson 
acts mystified by analyses that focus on these dynamics. 
Unwilling to examine the political motives and objectives 
lurking behind oppressive regimes’ appeals to Islam to 
justify policies violative of rights, he harps on a binary 
world in which a beleaguered monolithic “Islam” faces off 
against an arrogant, secular “West.” Imagining that this is 
a struggle in which an external force, the West, deploys 
human rights in a strategy for cultural domination, 
Strawson’s outlook closely resembles that of the famous 
political scientist Samuel P. Huntington – whom Strawson in 
a Lewis Carroll-ish twist renames “Patrick P. Huntington.”20 
In his “clash of civilizations” essay, Huntington claimed 
that the West engenders conflicts by inappropriately 
pressing “Western” human rights on resisting Muslims, who 
find them culturally alien. John Strawson shares the 
Huntingtonian perspective but adds a conspiratorial 
dimension, treating calls for respecting international 
human rights law as part of a Western plot against Islamic 
culture.  Thus, if I use international human rights law in 
critical assessments of how Islam has been deployed as a 
pretext for denying human rights, I am, in Strawson’s view, 
serving as an agent for a pernicious Western campaign to 
undermine Islamic culture.   
John Strawson insists on a Huntingtonian East-West 
split on human rights -- as if the International Bill of 
Human Rights were a product of “the West,” when in reality 
the historical record amply demonstrates that many Muslim 
countries -- as well as other non-Western countries -- 
played vital roles in the difficult work of shaping human 
                                                 
20 See John Strawson, “A Western Question to the Middle 
East: Is There a Human Rights Discourse in Islam?” Arab 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 20, n. 1 (Winter 1997), 51. 
rights principles.21 The major Western countries like the 
United States largely remained on the sidelines -- when not 
impeding the process of drafting the International Bill of 
Human Rights. Far from sharing Huntington’s views, I object 
to Huntington’s thesis so strongly that I was prompted to 
write a ninety-seven page article debunking it,22 an article 
that innumerable Muslims have told me that they have 
appreciated as a corrective to Western preconceptions about 
human rights being distinctively Western and about Islamic 
culture being inherently opposed to human rights.    
    In his determined campaign to portray me as a person 
infected with bigotry and anti-Islamic animus, John 
Strawson insistently presses a polemic based on the notion 
that I am deeply prejudiced against Islamic law and 
dedicated to proving the superiority of Western law. In a 
passage replete with grave accusations that he does not 
even attempt to substantiate, Strawson accuses me of 
representing Islamic law as “an essentially defective legal 
system,” “incomplete and inadequate.” He also pretends that 
I am claiming that European law is “superior,” 
”legitimate,” ”fully developed,” “a complete, established 
and definite legal system”23 – ideas that run directly 
counter to what I have written and taught over several 
decades.  He goes even further, asserting: “Her entire 
standpoint is ‘western (sic) superiority.’”24  He does not – 
and cannot -- offer one shred of evidence buttressing his 
outlandish assertions.  
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Waltz, “Universal Human Rights.”    
22 See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Universal versus Islamic Human 
Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?” 
Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 15 (Winter 
1994), 307- 404.    
23 John Strawson, Encountering Islamic Law. 
www.wponline.org/vil/Articles/shariah/jsrps.html 
[hereinafter Strawson, EIL, wponline]  On the Internet, I 
have switched back and forth in horrified fascination 
between the startling disinformation being purveyed on the 
website already cited in footnote 18 (referred to as EIL, 
Pakistan) and on the website cited here. I shall refer to 
both sites interchangeably.  Strawson’s “encounters,” as 
chronicled in the two websites may have minor differences. 
However, given the Mock Turtle spirit in which they were 
composed, they hardly merit scholarly line by line cross-
comparisons. 
24 Ibid. 
Not only am I free of the ugly Western triumphalism 
that John Strawson glibly and falsely imputes to me, but, 
not sharing Strawson’s binary vision, I do not use the 
kinds of stereotypes about “the West” and “Islam” or about 
“European law” and “Islamic law” that one finds in 
Strawson’s own work. Although in the course of longer 
discussions, I have as a matter of convenience often been 
obliged to resort to short hand terms like “the West,”  
“Islam,” or “the Muslim world,” any reader who peruses my 
arguments will see that I consistently stress that one 
cannot fairly generalize about “Islamic law,” which has 
always encompassed complex and diverse strands and which 
presently also morphs into many national variants – as well 
as variants reflecting numerous competing trends in 
contemporary Islamic thought.  In contrast, John Strawson 
often writes of two simple entities that might be compared 
with a view to establishing that one of the two were 
superior. Then, in a tactic that belongs at the Mad Tea 
Party, Strawson ascribes to me what are his stereotypes 
about “the West” and “Islam” as an oppositional pair and 
pretends that I use his stereotypes – stereotypes that I 
despise -- to establish the inferiority of Islam! 
Far from adopting European/Western law as a standard 
of perfection, I use international human rights law as my 
standard – a law in which inputs from Muslim delegates were 
significant and a law that the United States has largely 
refused to accept. Furthermore, I condemn laws and policies 
that fail to conform to international human rights law, 
regardless of whether these come from governments in 
Africa, Asia, or the Americas.  For example, I have 
lectured extensively about U.S. non-acceptance of 
international human rights law, I have critically assessed 
the Vatican’s and the U.S. government’s stances on 
international human rights, and I have contributed to 
critiques of the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices. 
Alas, the stark distortions that John Strawson purveys 
feed common misconceptions about human rights being 
inherently “Western” and also suit the designs of those who 
appeal to Islam as the means to defend Muslim countries 
from charges of perpetrating massive human rights 
violations. People are ready to accept at face value claims 
that confirm their stereotypes. The intellectual pollution 
caused by Stawson’s pseudo-scholarship, which pretends to 
dissect my publications while actually resorting to 
egregious misrepresentations, is, apparently, spreading.    
An ambition recent book on human rights and Islamic 
law by Mashood A. Baderin reveals the imprint of Strawson’s 
distortions. Although his work is far better researched 
than Strawson’s and is generally more respectful of the 
canons of scholarship, Baderin does resort to similar 
tactics to “prove” his contentions that supporting human 
rights universalism is simply a facet of Western cultural 
imperialism.25 In advancing his theme that calling for 
Muslims to enjoy the full human rights guaranteed under 
international law means imposing Western cultural values on 
resisting Muslims, Baderin explicitly cites Strawson’s 
views.26 Apparently influenced by Strawson, Baderin imagines 
that, when I talk about the need for universalism in the 
human rights domain, I am arguing that, in his words, 
“Western culture should serve as the universal normative 
model for the content of international human rights law,”27 
a glaring misrepresentation that is later repeated.28 
Following Strawson’s model of taking words out of context 
and then twisting them to “prove” a point, Baderin offers a 
mangled and misleading “quotation” from my Islam and human 
rights book to support the false insinuation I posit that 
“universalism” entails agreeing that “Islamic law has no 
normative value and enjoys little prestige.”29  In the 
actual text, when using the language last quoted, I am not 
positioning Islamic law vis-a-vis “universalism” but 
speaking of writings of specialists on international law, 
who work within the framework of “the Western legal 
heritage, within which Islamic law has no normative value 
and enjoys little prestige.”30 The actual passage deals with 
my characterization of the parochialism of the Western 
scholarly tradition; it is not presented as my own opinion, 
nor do I endorse it. Thus, one can see that Baderin – 
presumably inspired by Strawson’s “critique” – ignores what 
I have actually written in his efforts to establish that, 
when I treat the human rights provisions in international 
law as authoritative, this must be the same as denigrating 
Islam and demanding that Muslim countries defer to the 
alien Western tradition.  
                                                 
25   See e.g., the discussion in Mashood A. Baderin, 
International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 28-29. 
26  See ibid., 11. 
27 See ibid., 10.   
28 See ibid., 26. 
29 See ibid., 12. 
30 See Mayer, Islam and Human Rights,3rd ed., 41. 
   Significantly, in addition to replicating aspects of 
on Strawson’s “critique,” Baderin exhibits a philosophy 
regarding rules of Islamic dress that resembles that of 
Anouar Majid, not conceding that women should have any 
choice in deciding what Islamic modesty requirements 
entail. According to Baderin, Muslim women have only two 
options: they may choose either to be completely covered 
(as in the model of the Afghan burqa or Saudi abaya) or to 
conform to the Iranian style of hejab, which allows them to 
uncover their faces, hands, and feet while concealing 
everything else.31 Like Majid, he seems unconcerned by the 
reality that such restrictions on women’s dress are 
coercively imposed by states or vigilantes against the 
wishes of many of the affected women.  One can infer that a 
person who demands that Muslim women defer to his notions 
of correct Islamic dress would have reason to want to 
delegitimize Muslim women’s aspirations to enjoy the 
protections that international law would afford them. One 
could also presume that he would want to discredit the 
attitudes of a Muslim woman like Shirin Ebadi. who is a 
staunch supporter of international human rights law and 
sees it as protecting Muslim women’s right to veil or not 
to veil, whether in Europe or in Muslim countries. In these 
connections, one of the easiest gambits would be to 
announce that international human rights law is “too 
Western” for use in Muslim milieus and that Muslim women 
who demand that their rights be protected according to 
universal standards are cultural traitors whose opinions 
can be disregarded.     
In connection with Strawson’s charges that I am 
insisting on the superiority of Western law, in an 
assertion that Strawson probably imagined would be 
blistering, he trumpets: “France, the home of the 
Enlightenment, did not grant women the right to vote until 
after the Second World War.”32 Apparently, John Strawson 
hopes to convey to readers the idea that I would never have 
realized that the situation of women’s rights in France has 
even been anything but optimal!  However, in reality, I 
have written an article demonstrating how some 
discriminatory rules that are too casually associated with 
Islam have exact counterparts in French laws, at least as 
these stood until very recently.  I have explained that 
North African countries are really not far behind France in 
the pace at which their family laws are evolving. I have 
                                                 
31 Baderin, 65-66. 
32 Strawson, EIL, Pakistan. 
also pointed out how, in borrowing Swiss law in the 1920s, 
Turkey adopted a Western law with some of the same 
patriarchal features that are found in Islamic law. Far 
from singling out Islamic law as a special barrier to 
women’s rights, I have demonstrated how closely related are 
the patterns in legal developments relating to women’s 
rights issues on both sides of the Mediterranean.  I have 
also suggested that, when looking at aspects of women’s 
rights around the Mediterranean, we might dispense 
altogether with the category of “Islamic law,” employing a 
different category, “Mediterranean law.”33  
Moreover, I have argued that, in discussing the 
current transitional phase in the evolution of legal 
systems in Muslim countries, we should adopt the Italian 
comparativist Ugo Mattei’s classifications of the three 
historical stages that all legal systems pass through – 
precisely because I see strong parallels between this 
transitional phase and the stages of development that 
European systems have passed through.34 Now, why would I be 
pointing out the striking similarities between patterns in 
legal evolution in European and Muslim countries if I 
espoused the prejudiced stereotypes that Strawson imputes 
to me or if I believed in “othering” Islamic law? 
  Demonstrating more parallel developments, I have 
discussed the striking similarities in the resistance to 
women’s international human rights on the part of various 
Muslim countries, the Vatican, and the United States, all 
of which have had difficulties absorbing the principle of 
women’s equality in the Women’s Convention. My critical 
analysis of how closely related the supposedly “Islamic” 
and “Catholic” positions are and how they, in turn, closely 
correlate with the U.S. Government’s stance resisting 
                                                 
33 See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Reform of Personal Status Laws 
in North Africa: A Problem of Islamic Law or Mediterranean 
Law?” Middle East Journal, vol. 49 (1995), 432-46, 
republished as Women Living Under Muslim Laws Occasional 
Paper no.8, July 1996 (Grabels, France). 
34 I have proposed that a central problem for legal systems 
in contemporary Muslim countries is that they are afflicted 
by the symptoms of what Mattei calls “political law,” a 
problem that Islamists have naively tried to cure by 
recourse to Islamic law rather than by instituting the 
systemic reforms needed to establish the rule of law. See 
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Islamic Law as a Cure for Political 
Law: The Withering of an Islamist Illusion,” Mediterranean 
Politics, vol. 7 (Autumn 2002), 116-42. 
women’s equality, has won an appreciative audience in the 
Arab world, where it has been republished in both English 
and in Arabic.35 I have also specifically compared the U.S. 
deployment of constitutional pretexts for refusing to 
adhere to women’s international human rights to Muslim 
countries’ use of Islam in the same connection, 
demonstrating the analogies in the strategies involved.36  
Why would I be writing about how Muslim countries, the 
Vatican, and the United States have taken closely related 
stances in resisting women’s international human rights if 
I believed in Western superiority and the inferiority of 
Islamic law?    
I have shown how the Saudi prohibition on women 
driving cars was foreshadowed by events in the United 
States at the dawn of the automobile era.  I have reminded 
readers that research shows that, so threatening was 
women’s automobility to the U.S. status quo in the early 
twentieth century, that men strongly resisted allowing 
women to drive, offering a variety of rationales for why 
women did not belong behind the wheel.37 That is, I have 
tried to help Western readers understand that they need to 
look beyond “Islam” when analyzing a problem like why the 
Saudi government bars women from driving, demonstrating 
that in situations where the use of cars by women threatens 
to undermine male control – whether it be in the United 
States or in Saudi Arabia, rationalizations are devised for 
keeping the privilege of driving for men. If I am 
encouraging people to appreciate that, regardless of what 
                                                 
35 See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Rhetorical Strategies and 
Official Policies on Women's Rights: The Merits and 
Drawbacks of the New World Hypocrisy,” in Faith and 
Freedom:  Women's Human Rights in the Muslim World, Mahnaz 
Afkami, ed. (New York: I.B.-Tauris, 1995), 104-32, 
republished in Arabic in 15 Al-Raida (a journal published 
in Beirut by the Institute for Women’s Studies in the Arab 
World) (Winter/Spring 1997) and in a shorter version 
Damascus in Arabic in al-Nahj, vol. 11 (Autumn 1995). 
36 See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Where Does the U.S. Stand on 
Women’s Human Rights? Reflections in a Jaundiced Eye,” ASIL 
Human Rights Interest Group Newsletter, vol. 6 no. 1 
(Winter 1996), 18-21.    
37 See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Islam and Human Rights--
Different Issues, Different Contexts. Lessons from 
Comparisons,” in Islamic Law Reform and Human Rights: 
Challenges & Rejoinders, Tore Lindholm and Kari Vogt, eds. 
(Oslo: Nordic Human Rights Publications, 1993), 121-25. 
the Saudi Minister of the Interior may say, it is 
simplistic to assert that “Islam” bars Saudi women from 
taking the wheel, is it reasonable to accuse me of 
portraying Islam as defective? 
  I am as critical of the rationales that U.S. 
officialdom offers for non-compliance with human rights as 
I am of the Saudi rationale for barring women from driving. 
For example, in the course of a tough assessment of how and 
why the United States has used its Constitution as a 
pretext for non-compliance with international human rights 
law, I have pointed out how a worshipful attitude towards 
antiquated constitutional doctrines has been a factor 
leading to the United States lagging behind the standards 
of international human rights law.38  Why would I be 
discussing U.S. backwardness in assimilating international 
human rights if I were trying to present Western law as 
being “superior” and “fully developed,” as John Strawson 
charges? 
One of John Strawson’s favorite gambits is critique-
by-epithet, and he hurls epithets with casual abandon. 
According to him, I am, among other things, a “positivist.” 
Now, in the legal domain, people use “positivist” in a 
variety of senses, so it would behoove someone who 
apparently thinks that positivism is a very bad thing to 
explain precisely how and why it applies to a given 
author’s work.  However, offering clear explanations is not 
Strawson’s style, so one is left to speculate why he would 
paste the “positivist” label on a scholar like myself who 
highlights how political interests shape what is presented 
as “law.”  I shall not lose any sleep worrying about what 
basis Strawson might fancy that he has for this accusation, 
because he so regularly attacks me as if I had written 
precisely the opposite of what I have written.  Thus, given 
Strawson’s proclivities, it is fair to assume that his 
accusations that I am a positivist reflect the reality that 
I am not a positivist, which puts one in mind of Lewis 
Carroll’s king, who says: “If there's no meaning in it . . 
. that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't 
try to find any.” 
However, there is another aspect to glib accusations 
of “positivism.”  Over the years I have witnessed a pattern 
on the part of persons eager to jumpstart their careers who 
fling about denunciations of “positivist” scholarship. In 
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this context, “positivist” scholarship often turns out to 
be scholarship that is fully documented and extensively 
researched. As far as I can tell, blasting “positivism” 
serves the goal for many “anti-positivists” of implicitly 
downgrading the importance of accuracy and a solid research 
basis, thereby rehabilitating (at least in their own eyes) 
the quality of their own writings.  If scholars who take 
pains trying to make their assessments well-grounded and 
accurate can be dismissed as “positivists,” so the 
accusers’ attenuated logic would seem to run, then they 
themselves cannot be faulted for making careless and 
inaccurate allegations.  In this “anti-positivist” schema, 
making unresearched counterfactual assertions can be 
elevated to a virtue. 
If one is committed to operating in an “anti-
positivist” mode, why not be “creative” about changing 
important historical dates?  No slouch in this regard, John 
Strawson coins a new, imaginary date for the 1979 post-
revolutionary Iranian Constitution, which he dates to 
1980.39 In a perfect illustration of the level of John 
Strawson’s qualifications, not only does he give readers 
the wrong date, but he attacks me in the associated 
footnote, asserting “Mayer refers to the Constitution that 
emerged after the Islamic Revolution as dated 1979, in fact 
it was adopted in May 1980.”40  This example embodies 
Strawson’s “anti-positivist” attempt to lure unwary readers 
into his through-the-looking-glass world. I did not invent 
the 1979 date; there is ample evidence in the historical 
record supporting it.41 In another instance of “anti-
positivism,” John Strawson boldly makes up out of whole 
cloth a new – and false -- date for the 1993 Vienna Human 
Rights Conference; Strawson moves in back one year to 
1992.42   
In another example of his “anti-positivist” modus 
operandi, John Strawson pretends that I harbor the illusion 
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that I can channel a late Pakistani Islamist! He maintains 
that I have had the astounding presumption when discussing 
Tabandeh and Mawdudi, two figures prominent in the reaction  
against human rights, to assert that I can be “certain that 
what the former (the more conservative of the two), said in 
print was what Mawdudi really thought, but for political 
reasons would not write.”43(emphasis added) In reality, on 
the page that Strawson refers to, one can see that, far 
from presuming that I possess the psychic capacity to 
intuit what were Mawdudi’s unwritten ideas, I am expressly 
relying on texts -- Mawdudi’s own publications, which are 
cited with references to the relevant pages.44  Thus, far 
from claiming that these are positions that Mawdudi “for 
political reasons would not write,”(emphasis added) I am 
steering readers to textual sources, where they can find 
what Mawdudi did write. And, no, I do not indicate that 
Mawdudi adheres to the same positions as Tabandeh; I make a 
more nuanced assertion, noting that his positions “are 
similar to Tabandeh’s, with the exception that Mawdudi 
believed that women should be able to sue for divorce on 
liberal grounds.”45  That is, far from saying that what 
Tabandeh said “was what Mawdudi really thought” as John 
Strawson alleges, I highlight an important area where, 
based on consulting texts, I have noted that the two 
differ. Reading John Strawson’s far fetched assertions, one 
recalls a line from Lewis Carroll: “Contrariwise," 
continued Tweedledee, "if it was so, it might be, and if it 
were so, it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't. That's 
logic!" 
  In a further “anti-postivist” gambit, John Strawson 
attacks me for insisting on my version of Islam: “Mayer 
still seems dissatisfied that the texts that she chose do 
not measure up to her Islam, and therefore she imputes even 
more conservative meanings to them.”46(emphasis added) My 
Islam? Apparently, Strawson wants to convince readers that, 
although a non-Muslim, I take positions on Muslims’ 
doctrinal quarrels! In reality, I consistently position 
myself as an outsider observing inter-Islamic disputes 
about law and doctrine. I have repeatedly refused  
invitations to write and speak about Islam in any normative 
or prescriptive sense, my position being that Muslims alone 
should do this.  If there is something to which I do refer 
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as normative is definitely not any religion; it is 
international human rights law. I have never tried to 
conceal that I support international human rights law or 
that I am gratified to see religious thought -- and not 
only Islamic thought -- evolving in directions that bring 
religious teachings and human rights into harmonious 
coexistence. However, my admitted sympathies for 
progressive interpretations of religious traditions, 
including Islam, is not the same thing as my presuming that 
I should or could impose my opinions on persons of other 
faiths wrestling with their doctrinal disputes! 
   It is especially ironic to have John Strawson 
complaining about my deploying what is supposedly my 
version of Islam when in Strawson’s work he keeps pressing 
a version of Islam that one might fairly call “Strawson’s 
Islam.”  Strawson seems to have drunk deeply from the well 
of Islamist cliches and to have absorbed typical 
stereotypes that one finds in Islamist tracts.  He implies 
that there is one Islamic outlook that leads to Muslims all 
thinking that they must be governed by their religious law, 
because for Muslims secular systems are unnatural. “From 
the Islamic standpoint, Islamic law is a system of 
regulation that . . .  is itself created by God . . .As a 
consequence, within the Islamic outlook, it is difficult to 
conceive of a secular state or a secular legal 
system.”47(emphasis added) Strawson could potentially 
correct his stereotypes about Muslims having difficulty 
conceiving of a secular state or legal system by consulting 
the thoughtful analyses of secularism and Islam offered by 
Sami Zubaida.48  But, actually learning about the secular 
dimensions of the Islamic heritage would be the concern of 
a scholar, not a task for a polemicist seeking to spin a 
particular line.   
Endorsing “the Islamic outlook,” John Strawson reveals 
that he shares Islamists’ bitterness over the displacement 
of Islamic law by Western law, which he sees as being 
imposed on unwilling Muslims by hostile Western forces 
determined to undermine Islamic culture.  His 
misconceptions about earlier legal history tie on with his 
mistaken belief that demands for respect for the human 
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rights developed under U.N. auspices entail imposing a 
“Western” law inimical to Islamic culture. Embracing 
typical Islamist views, he seems to think that Islamic law 
constitutes a viable system suitable for immediate 
implementation in contemporary Muslim countries -- – 
despite the fact that it in almost all countries Islamic 
law has fallen into desuetude. He fails to consider that, 
having long been in abeyance, Islamic law has not been 
comprehensively streamlined and updated and has not been 
expanded to cover numerous new areas of law that have 
emerged in the last century.  Arduous work would have be 
invested to rework the Islamic legal corpus in order to 
distill from the enormously complex sources and 
jurisprudence of the past the foundations for a viable 
modern legal system. Even Saudi Arabia has in recent years 
had to adjust to a vastly expanded role for secular 
regulation, finding insufficient guidance in Islamic law 
for the many new issues that are coming up. 
John Strawson seems to believe that Iran’s 
Islamization program has already proven his thesis that 
Islamic law can easily be picked up and applied in all 
areas without further ado. He quotes with approval Chibli 
Mallat’s encomium to “the success and durability of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran.”49 Strawson’s warm enthusiasm 
for Iranian Islamists’ project of reimposing Islamic law is 
suggestive of an ideological rigidity that precludes taking  
into account Iranians’ overwhelmingly negative reactions to 
having to endure rule by a corrupt and oppressive 
theocratic clique.50  
 John Strawson discounts Iranians’ alienation from the 
official Islamic system and their mounting demands for 
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secularization. The clamor for secularization is 
particularly strong where human rights are concerned.51  
This clamor has grown so loud that, in an effort to cater 
to the surge in pro-secular sentiment, the ambitious former 
President Hashemi-Rafsanjani (himself a cleric) in January 
2005 publicly tried to win popularity by recasting Iran’s 
system as a basically secular democratic one.52  Strawson 
also apparently assumes that Iran’s “success” in 
Islamization went much further than it actually did. The 
fact that a clique of clerical hardliners holds the reins 
of power in the wake of the Islamic Revolution is 
politically significant, but it has not led to Iran’s 
repudiation of the French foundations of the legal order. 
As those who know the Iranian situation can attest, the 
secular foundations of the Shah’s legal and governmental 
system remain, although these are obscured by superimposed 
elements of the official ideology like the rule by the 
faqih and clerical domination of crucial institutions and 
the incorporation of elements from the medieval Islamic 
heritage like penalties of stoning and amputations, and 
floggings of women not wearing proper Islamic dress.   
Iran’s heritage of French law has recently been 
augmented by new laws enacted by the Majles, most of which 
have no derivation from Islam – a fact that is publicly 
acknowledged even by Iran’s ruling clerics.53  With 
perceptions shaped by Islamist literature, John Strawson is 
ill-prepared to accept this; he, after all, insists that 
Islamic law offers comprehensive coverage, addressing “all 
areas of social regulation, in Western categories, from 
criminal law to family law, from constitutional law to 
public international law.”54  It is high time for Strawson 
to redirect his pique and to start scolding Iran’s 
theocratic leaders for failing by such a wide margin to 
rely on Islamic law, which he knows suffices for all their 
needs, even though Iranians – including Iran’s ruling 
clerics -- have concluded that it does not.  
    Mired in rigid preconceptions about a gulf separating 
“the West” and “Islam,” John Strawson is impeded from 
recognizing that the hybrid legal system that antedated the 
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Islamic revolution continues.  (This hybridity is typical 
of contemporary Middle Eastern legal systems where official 
Islamization has been undertaken.) Iran’s approach to human 
rights, in which the regime’s “Islamic” restrictions are 
superimposed on borrowed human rights principles, is a 
quintessential model of such hybridization -- an unstable 
compromise between secular law and what hardline clerics 
would say are mandatory Islamic norms curbing rights and 
freedoms.  
Presumably, John Strawson’s refusal to acknowledge 
this hybridity – a real world fact that is hard to 
reconcile with his belief in “the success” of the Islamic 
revolution -- is a factor impeding him from following my 
discussions of Islamic human rights schemes and prompting 
him to imagine that my criticisms of Iran’s “Islamic” human 
rights formulations amount to attacks on Islam per se. 
Those familiar with Strawson’s “anti-positivist” style will 
not be surprised to see that, after insisting on the 
polarity of the West and “Islam” and after displaying a 
lack of awareness of the significance of hybridity for 
“Islamic” human rights formulations, Strawson laments that 
Western scholars are guilty of underestimating the 
hybridity of legal cultures55 – as if he himself were not a 
prime culprit in this regard.  
John Strawson’s idiosyncratic vision of Middle Eastern 
legal history plays a part in his mischaracterization of my 
work on human rights and his insistence that it serves an 
Orientalist/Imperialist agenda.  Thus, one needs to examine 
Strawson’s preconceptions about legal history. What does 
Strawson imagine caused Western law to be adopted?  
Islamists routinely blame European Imperialism for this, 
and Strawson follows their line.56 More specifically, 
Strawson blames a sinister Anglo-American axis for the 
decline of Islamic power and the displacement of Islamic 
law. (Presumably, he imagines that I am tied to this 
sinister axis.)  He opines: “A critical consequence of the 
Anglo-American construction of Islamic law is the 
destruction of the legitimacy of Islamic power within 
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Islamic society and within the wider world . . . Islamic 
principles are replaced with European ones.”57   
Many unanswered questions are prompted by this claim, 
which seems to reflect an ethnocentric perspective, one 
that places the British legal system at the center of the 
legal universe. John Strawson cannot, of course, reconcile 
his claim that the “destruction of the legitimacy of 
Islamic power” occurred via the “Anglo-American 
construction of Islamic law” with the reality that few 
Muslim countries have any links to the Anglo-American 
tradition. True -- certain Muslim countries such as 
Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Sudan were colonized by 
Britain long enough for the common law to take root, but 
most Muslim countries have been oriented towards the 
overwhelmingly dominant model of Continental European law. 
If “the Anglo-American construction of Islamic law” had had 
the portentous impact that John Strawson ascribes to it, 
why and how did it lead to the replacement of Islamic law 
by laws alien to the Anglo-American world, like the 
codified laws of countries such as France, Germany, Italy, 
and Switzerland?  
In his lectures on websites about legal history, John 
Strawson completely ignores a global phenomenon -- that 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there was a 
near-universal consensus among the countries of the world 
that codified Continental European law was the most 
efficient and appropriate system for use by the modern 
nation-state, with the countries forcibly colonized by 
Britain long enough for the common law system to take root 
remaining the exceptions. Contrary to the way that Strawson 
prefers to depict developments, although European 
colonization was one means of transplanting laws, European 
domination was not essential when the merits of codified 
Continental European law were so obvious. Thus, for 
example, Japan, a country never colonized and certainly not 
under Teutonic domination, decided in the nineteenth 
century to adopt German law. Far from being overwhelmed by 
Strawson’s imaginary Anglo-American juggernaut, governments 
in the Middle East were often independently engaged in the 
process of legal reform and, like Japan, preferred 
borrowing Continental European codes. After evaluating the 
modern civil law and its archaic Anglo-American 
counterpart, these governments dismissed the latter as 
distinctly inferior and unworthy of emulation.   
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In this connection John Strawson presents what is 
meant to be an historical account of Egyptian law in the 
nineteenth century, concentrating on the deprecatory 
attitudes of the British towards Islamic law and Islamic 
courts, as if the negative attitudes of British 
Imperialists would have been the determining factor in 
displacing Islamic law in Egypt.58 From Strawson’s account, 
a reader with no knowledge of Egyptian legal history would 
assume that Egypt under British Occupation must have been 
forced to adopt British law. But what does history tell us 
actually happened?  
In a crucial development – one ignored by John 
Strawson -- members of the Egyptian elite, during the 
period when Egypt was still independent and prior to the 
British Occupation, adopted French law in many areas, a law 
that Egyptians refused to abandon during the decades of the 
British Occupation despite pressures from the British 
colonial authorities, who wanted them to adopt British law. 
As Nathan Brown accurately observes in his assessment of 
how Egypt’s rulers unsentimentally discarded most of 
Islamic law in the nineteenth century, they replaced 
Islamic law by French law because the latter was better 
suited to their objectives. “What attracted such elites was 
not the Western nature of the legal systems they 
constructed but the increased control, centralization and 
penetration they offered.”59 The actual story of Egyptians 
choosing to import French law on their own and scorning 
British appeals to adopt the common law does not fit within 
Strawson’s preconceptions, according to which Muslim 
societies are passive victims of encroaching 
Westernization, as helpless as the hapless Dormouse at the 
Mad Tea Party. 
Given the active role played by governmental elites in 
Middle Eastern countries in transplanting Continental 
European laws, it is bizarre to blame Westerners and their 
smug belief in the superiority of Western law for the 
desuetude into which Islamic law has fallen. John Strawson 
should redirect his energy to convincing governments of 
Middle Eastern countries that they need to follow Islamic 
law and that it was a terrible mistake to borrow 
Continental European law and/or to retain their Westernized 
legal systems after achieving independence.  These 
governments, after all, are the decision-makers in this 
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regard, not the proponents of his “Anglo-American 
construction” or the Western Colonialist/Orientalist 
scholarly cabal to which Strawson attributes such decisive 
impact.   
Refusing to acknowledge this reality and rejecting the 
possibility that internal political dynamics could lead 
Muslim countries to abandon Islamic law, John Strawson 
lectures that: “Even within the Islamic world, by the time 
Kemal Attaturk(sic) came to power, the West had won the 
legal argument, Islamic law was backward and European law 
modern. The establishment of a secular republic in Turkey, 
and with it the abolition of the Caliphate, was a logical 
result of the pressure of the West on Islamic culture.”60 In 
this comment, Strawson reveals how his thinking flows in 
the Islamist groove, Islamists being inclined to 
romanticize the last Ottoman rulers as being stalwart 
defenders of the independence of Muslim societies against 
Western inroads. Refusing to consider the actual historical 
background of Ataturk’s reforms, Strawson presses the idea 
that the only relevant factors in the secularization of the 
laws in Muslim countries could be external Western 
pressures aimed at destroying “Islamic culture,” a culture 
that he imagines would flourish if only these external 
Western pressures would cease.   
One notes how John Strawson converts Mustafa Kemal’s 
honorific title “Ataturk” into “Attaturk,” thereby changing 
“father Turk” into “(nonsense word) Turk.” (This kind of 
misspelling of “Ataturk” is extremely common among English 
speakers who read little about Turkey.) In Strawson’s case, 
it seems that he has paid as little attention to crucial 
elements in Ataturk’s biography as he has to his name.  In 
1911 Ataturk had been sent to Libya where he sought to 
organize Libyan Muslims to fight for the Sultan against the 
invading Italians – finding scant support for the Ottoman 
cause. Near the end of World War I he was stationed on the 
southern front, where the Turks were forced to retreat by 
the advance of the combined forces of the British and the 
Arabs, who were fighting a jihad -- a jihad, be it noted, 
that was being waged by Arab Muslims against Turkish 
Muslims and against the Ottoman Sultan.  Not surprisingly, 
Ataturk was unimpressed by romantic notions of pan-Islamic 
solidarity!   
Besides, in the aftermath of the war, the Ottoman 
Sultan, with support from many in the religious 
establishment, turned out to be a willing tool of European 
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powers, which were bent on carving up Turkey and putting 
the straits under European control.  Infuriated by 
Ataturk’s spearheading the nationalist resistance to this 
plan, the Sultan proclaimed that killing the nationalists 
was a religious duty, and the highest Ottoman religious 
authority called for killing Ataturk. Not surprisingly, the 
Turkish nationalists drew the conclusion that these old 
Ottoman institutions were inimical to the cause of Turkish 
independence. After the 1923 nationalist triumph in driving 
out the invading Europeans and establishing favorable peace 
terms, which included ending the humiliating regime of 
capitulations that had signaled European superiority, 
Ataturk devoted himself to reforms designed to strengthen 
Turkey. The days of the Caliphate were numbered – and not 
because of “the pressure of the West on Islamic culture,” 
as those who follow the Islamist line would have it, but 
because of the Caliphate’s demonstrated willingness to ally 
itself with the European invaders, a rank betrayal of the 
Turkish nationalist cause. 
The year 1926 saw the Turkish importation of the Swiss 
Civil Code. Contrary to what John Strawson imagines, this 
was not a result of external pressures from European 
powers, but was an initiative undertaken by Turkey’s young, 
Swiss-educated Minister of Justice, who had been impressed 
during his studies in Switzerland by Swiss democracy and 
who found it desirable to borrow a codified law for which 
the needed commentaries had been already worked out.61 If 
Strawson’s students take seriously his admonition that 
Turkish secularization had to come about as the result of 
the “pressure of the West on Islamic culture,” they must 
imagine that hordes of fierce Swiss mercenaries imbued with 
an anti-Islamic animus encircled Ankara at a vulnerable 
moment and forced the personage whom Strawson calls 
“(nonsense word) Turk” to defer to the standards in use in 
Geneva and Zurich.  
That the only radical, complete secularization 
undertaken in an independent Muslim country occurred in 
Turkey after the Turkish nationalists had triumphed, 
achieving one of the rare, ringing military defeats that 
Muslims have been able to inflict on predatory European 
forces in recent centuries, handily disproves John 
Strawson’s thesis that Muslims’ abandonment of Islamic law 
and borrowing of Western law occur as a result of Muslim 
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weakness and Western domination. But, the actual history of 
Turkey’s adoption of European civil law is not the kind of 
thing that would deter a person with Strawson’s mindset 
from portraying this development as a consequence of 
Turkey’s will to stand by Islamic law being overborne by 
pressures from Western Imperialism, especially of the 
Anglo-Saxon kind. 
John Strawson’s misapprehensions about how Turkey’s 
secularization occurred are linked to his misperceptions of 
how international human rights law relates to problems in 
Muslim societies. To his way of thinking, the Swiss Civil 
Code adopted under Ataturk could only be an alien 
imposition, and so is international law – including 
international human rights law.  He cancels out the agency 
of people within Muslim societies and discounts the 
possibility that Muslims might choose to resort to European 
codes or international law after concluding that these 
provide useful solutions to the actual problems facing 
their societies. 
John Strawson cannot conceive of a situation where 
Muslims would assess their needs in starkly practical 
terms, deciding that protections for their human rights 
were needed and concluding that international human rights 
law was well designed to curb prevailing abuses -- like 
tyrannical governments, rampant discrimination, draconian 
censorship, arbitrary and politicized justice, and cruel 
and inhuman treatment of detainees. Just as Swiss law could 
only come into Turkey as a result of Western pressures, so, 
according to Strawson’s imaginings, international human 
rights law could only come into Muslim societies as a 
result of Western threats and predations.   
Like the scholar whom he calls “Patrick P. 
Huntington,” John Strawson associates calls for human 
rights, democracy, and pluralism with outsiders, not 
conceding the fact that they also are voiced – often 
urgently – by denizens of Muslim societies. Strawson 
maintains that those who call for “human rights, democracy, 
and pluralism” are carrying out a new version of the old 
the colonialist project.62 Now, as applied to President 
George W. Bush and his circle, Strawson’s charge that 
expressed concern for human rights, democracy, and 
pluralism should be seen as linked to neocolonialism would 
have merit. However, he can have no basis whatsoever for 
associating me with the U.S. neo-conservatives who seek to 
advance U.S. hegemonic designs under the rubric of 
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advancing rights and freedoms.  Among other things, I call 
for universal respect for international law, a law that 
applies as much to the United States as it does to other 
countries, and, like other principles supporters of 
international law, I deplore the way that the current Bush 
administration cavalierly disregards and violates 
international law.   
In John Stawson’s view, Muslims should eschew the U.N. 
system of international law as alien and should instead be 
using their own international law. Not content with 
accusing Western colonialism of displacing Islamic law 
within Muslim countries, Strawson claims that Western power 
also unfairly sidelined Islamic law in the international 
arena. For example, he indignantly protests that ash-
Shaybani’s treatise as-Siyar “contains detailed codes on 
the Law of War”(sic) and that many of its “propositions on 
the Law of War(sic), would not seem unfamiliar to the 
modern student of international law.”63  
The invocation of siyar brings on John Strawson’s 
disquisition on what he calls “siyrat”(sic) -- a 
particularly revealing example of his “anti-positivist” 
methods.64 Now, readers should note that by “siyrat”(sic) 
Strawson intends to refer to the Arabic noun sira, a 
singular noun, which is siyar in the plural form. Strawson 
identifies “siyrat”(sic) — his garbled version the Arabic 
singular sira -- as being the plural of what Strawson 
claims is a singular noun, siyar – in reality, the Arabic 
plural.65 That is, Strawson misspells the singular noun sira 
-- there being no word “siyrat” in Arabic -- and confuses 
it with the plural form of the noun. Strawson also concocts 
an “anti-positivist” way of deriving Arabic words, 
asserting that siyar “comes from the plural siyrat(sic).”66  
This derivation scheme is, of course, totally spurious.  
Arabic words derive from their roots, the root in this case 
being sara.   
The concentrated disinformation contained in this 
“lesson” that Strawson offers about the Arabic language 
merits consideration. It should wave a red warning flag for 
readers who might not otherwise be attuned to the Humpty-
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Dumpty-ish character of John Strawson’s lectures. This  
nonsense is accompanied by a neat pseudo-scholarly twist; 
in connection with his disquisition on siyar, Strawson 
stresses his concern for accuracy lest he “convey the wrong 
cultural metaphor and be construed as Orientalist.”67  Thus, 
at the same time that, following the model of Lewis 
Carroll’s Jabbewocky, he fancifully invents and twists 
Arabic, he pretends to have a scholarly concern to respect 
the canons of Arabic and thereby to avoid the dreaded 
pitfalls of Orientalism.  
As part of his complaints directed at the supposed 
Western determination to sideline the Islamic version of 
international law, John Strawson complains “Islamic law has 
as much claim as any other system to be included.”68 Now, 
those of us who examine developments in the real world 
would point to an obvious problem in John Strawson’s claim 
that it is Westerners who are to be blamed for sidelining 
Islamic law: Islamic international law has long been 
abandoned by Muslim countries. Even the members of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference have elected to 
follow the U.N. system of international law in their 
dealings with each other rather than to apply Islamic law. 
If members of the OIC had found Islamic international law 
adequate and appropriate for governing their interactions, 
it would have been perfectly feasible for them to select 
Islamic law as their governing law, just as European Union 
countries have elected to be governed by European law. That 
they have not done so is one indication that Islamic 
international law is not viewed by Muslim governments as 
being suited for use in contemporary circumstances. If 
Strawson ever stepped outside his through-the-looking-glass 
domain, he might also note that some of the rules devised 
over one thousand years ago necessarily contain certain 
features that are ill-suited for contemporary use -- not 
only in the opinion of the “Orientalists,” but also in the 
opinion of contemporary Muslim states.69 Instead of blaming 
people in the West for imagining the unsuitability of 
Islam’s version of international law, Strawson should 
logically be directing his ire at OIC member countries, 
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demanding that they cease and desist using conventional 
international law and agree to be governed by Islamic law.   
   Because John Strawson is determined to situate me in 
the company of Orientalists who would not recognize that 
Islamic law could be of any relevance for international 
disputes, he naturally refuses to acknowledge what I have 
published in this area.  In an example of his “anti-
positivism” run amok, Strawson charges that, due to my 
“positivist methodology” I cannot understand that the ICJ 
can refer to Islamic law.70  However, in reality I have 
discussed how Islamic law was factored into the ICJ’s 
analysis of the issues in the Western Sahara case, which 
was decided in 1982.  In the course of my discussion, I 
demonstrated how Islamic law can provide decisional 
guidelines for judges dealing with a contemporary 
international case.71  With a blithe disregard for accuracy, 
John Strawson chooses to write as if I had not discussed 
how the ICJ has used Islamic law and perversely insists: 
“For Mayer, Islamic law confronts the international legal 
order. It is not part of it, it is the ‘other.’”72 Strawson 
waxes indignant about “committed orientalists”(sic) who see 
Islamic law “as conservative, aberrant and to be kept out 
of power-defining relationships . . . as a defective legal 
system,” and sniffs disdainfully: “Mayer continues this 
methodology. . .”73   
    To establish that I am infected by misbegotten 
Orientalist prejudices, John Strawson thinks it useful to 
distort what I have said about Edward Said. It seems that 
Strawson has no interest in researching Edward Said’s 
belief in human rights universality, which resembles my 
own. Strawson chooses instead to imagine that Said shares 
his convictions that human rights universalism is a Western 
colonialist project. He is not alone in refusing to admit 
that Said was a human rights universalist. As Tony Judt, 
Said’s distinguished colleague and friend, has rightly 
observed, Said became “the idolized hero of a generation of 
cultural relativists in universities” who went on to 
denounce “Western Culture” as part of “career building 
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exercises in ‘postcolonial’ obscurantism (‘writing the 
other’).”74 In reality, as Judt points out, Said was imbued 
with a “deeply felt humanistic impulse” and insisted that 
human rights are not “cultural or grammatical things, and 
when they are violated . . . they are as real as anything 
we can encounter.”75   
   I could go on at much greater length in cataloguing the 
way  that John Strawson misrepresents the relationship 
between Said’s positions and my own, but one illustration 
will have to suffice. In this connection, Strawson resorts 
to one of his more extreme “anti-positivist” claims, 
pretending to have discovered that I am wrong about how 
Said’s Orientalism pertains to legal issues.  He warns 
readers: “This also demonstrates that Mayer’s strictures 
that Said’s Orientalism . . .is mainly confined to 
‘anthropology and philosophy’ would seem to be erroneous.”76 
In reality, I have never uttered the proposition that 
Strawson attributes to me, never made the ludicrous claim 
that Said’s book is mainly confined to anthropology and 
philosophy.  Instead, in a passage that John Strawson has 
mischievously altered, I do assert that: “cultural 
relativism . . . is a term that was developed for use in 
anthropology and moral philosophy.”77(emphasis added) That 
is, John Strawson substitutes “Said’s Orientalism” for the 
original subject, “cultural relativism,” and then 
pontificates that the passage as he has rewritten it “would 
seem to be erroneous” – a flourish worthy of Humpty Dumpty 
himself.  In reacting to this nonsense, I might echo Lewis 
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passage, in a section of the book expressly headed 
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Taking a cultural relativist stance to deny the 
universality of human rights and to challenge the validity 
of comparative examination of international and Islamic 
versions of rights is problematic for several reasons.  An 
initial point that needs to be made is that cultural 
relativism, like Said’s idea of Orientalism, is not a 
concept developed for application in the field of law or 
for evaluating whether governments of nations are adhering 
to international legal norms. Instead, it is a term that 
was developed for use in anthropology and moral philosophy. 
Ibid.   
Carroll, characterizing John Strawson as being like Humpty 
Dumpty, “sitting with his legs crossed, like a Turk, on the 
top of a high wall.”  This characterization makes no sense 






 What one sees in John Strawson’s work is an approach 
that places him at the very opposite end of the scale from 
what animates meaningful scholarship on human rights, like 
Ronald Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously. As entertaining 
as it might be to see pseudo-scholarship in some areas 
carried out in the spirit of Lewis Carroll, when it comes 
to the subject of human rights in the contemporary Middle 
East, the issues are far too portentous for such tactics to 
be acceptable – at least for those of us who do take human 
rights seriously.  Alas, publications that grossly 
mischaracterize the secondary literature on this subject 
are becoming all too typical.  This means that, in order to 
ensure that they do not become dupes of disinformation 
campaigns, readers need to approach the relevant literature 
with wariness.  Undocumented claims need to be treated with 
great skepticism, and claims that purport to rest on 
documentation need to be cross-checked by consulting the 
originals.  But, this entails time-consuming efforts that 
distract people from examining the actual human rights 
problems in Muslim societies, problems that have in some 
cases escalated to an even more acute crisis levels in the 
wake of unilateralist interventions of the second Bush 
Administration. For those of us who care about the human 
rights problems afflicting contemporary Muslim societies – 
many of which are now connected to U.S. neo-cons’ policies 
of reshaping the Middle East, having to address and correct 
the disinformation being deliberately disseminated by such 
frivolous “critiques” rankles.    
  At a time when many Muslim societies are in agony, how 
can we account for the dedication on the part of some 
would-be “experts” on Islam and human rights to purveying 
travesties of the secondary literature?  At a time when 
governments are oppressing and abusing people while 
disseminating specious propaganda about their supposed 
support for human rights, what explains the dedication of 
people posing as scholars to putting forward “critiques” 
designed not to elucidate human rights issues but to 
obfuscate and mislead? One is drawn to troubling 
speculations about the possible inducements that have 
motivated people to produce such travesties, which cannot 
possibly serve any constructive purpose.  
    I mentioned at the outset my preoccupation with the 
suffering caused by human rights violations in Sudan; a 
little lesson in human rights universalism taken from that 
same unhappy country deserves to be mentioned in this 
conclusion. When I went to Sudan over two decades ago, I 
was appalled by the torments suffered by its inhabitants 
under a brutal military dictatorship – one that was backed 
by the United States. To my distress, although the names of 
the military dictators have since changed, the miseries 
inflicted on the Sudanese population have altered little in 
the intervening years. The toll of deaths from the 
devastating civil war, provoked by the Islamization program 
launched in 1983, has in the interim mounted to at least 
two million. So severe has the repression been that the 
valiant Sudanese human rights activists whom I met in 1984-
85 have since been forced to move to lives in exile.  
Humanitarian crises in the eastern and western parts of 
that country have also burgeoned.  And, in the wake of 
Sudanese moves to propitiate the United States, this 
horribly misgoverned country is likely to again be included 
in the list of U.S. friends in the region.  
  One of the great villains in the tale of the woes of 
Sudan in this period is the prominent Islamist ideologue 
Hassan al-Turabi, once a cheerleader for Nimeiri’s 
reactionary and destructive Islamization program. Unable to 
win power in free elections held in the brief period of 
democracy after Nimeiri’s overthrow, Turabi gained a 
dominant position after the 1989 coup by Omar Hassan al-
Bashir, which replaced Sudan’s elected leaders by another 
military dictatorship committed to Islamization.  
   Turabi and his party worked comfortably in a Sudanese 
system where human rights violations were legion and 
political repression was the norm.78 Turabi participated in 
the cover up of rights violations. As Sudanese were 
detained and savagely tortured in Sudan’s notorious “ghost 
houses,” Turabi persisted in denials that serious abuses 
were occurring.79 In 2001 after many years in which Turabi 
seemed to be in control -- notwithstanding Bashir’s formal 
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leadership, the two fell out, and Bashir established the 
upper hand, arresting Turabi.  
  When allied with local dictatorships, Turabi showed 
callous indifference to the sufferings of victims of rights 
violations perpetrated by the Sudanese Government.  
Where the Sudanese who were oppressed, imprisoned, 
tortured, persecuted, and slaughtered in the course of 
Turabi’s Islamization programs were concerned, he refused 
to recognize the legitimacy of challenges to rights 
violations based on the criteria of international human 
rights law. As long as he was in the power elite and in a 
position to press his ambitious Islamist agenda, Turabi’s 
sole commitment was to amass the power to lead an 
aggressive Islamization campaign.  However, he discovered 
the hard way what pervasive disregard for human rights and 
democratic values can lead to. Turabi seems not to have 
calculated that he might some day wind up on the losing end 
of a power struggle among Sudanese Islamists. Once this 
occurred, instead of continuing his previous line that 
Islamization was all that mattered, he suddenly acted as if 
Sudanese Muslims could legitimately make claims against 
Bashir’s Islamist regime on the basis of the U.N. human 
rights system, as if oppression in the cause of Islamism 
were not above challenge.  
    Angry over his protracted detention, Turabi demanded to 
have the protections of precisely those principles of 
international human rights law that he and his Islamist 
allies had shredded in the course of their campaign 
forcibly to impose an Islamic system on the Sudan and to 
crush all dissent. Turabi tacitly came around to the 
proposition that Islamist regimes had to respect 
international human rights standards, a position that at 
least on its surface resembles that of the Sudanese human 
rights activists who had been persecuted by Sudan’s 
Islamist regimes since 1983. In hopes of winning 
international backing for his claims that his human rights 
had been violated and obtaining his release from detention 
-- an extremely comfortable detention in comparison with 
the terrible conditions in which Sudanese have typically 
been held, Turabi’s defense committee appealed to 
international organizations that employed international 
human rights law to judge abuses.80 (One wonders if the 
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system will ever decide that a prominent Islamist like 
Turabi must likewise be denounced for appealing to 
standards that they characterize as alien, Western, and 
utterly unsuitable for use in Muslim societies!)   
     As much as I deplore his vile record, I concur that, 
like all human beings, Turabi is entitled to the 
protections of international human rights law.81  However, 
it is a tragedy for his country that, when this influential 
Islamist was a powerful figure on the Sudanese political 
scene, he did not recognize that his fellow Sudanese 
deserved to enjoy the same kinds of protections that he 
would later invoke when his own interests were at stake.  
When Turabi had been at or near the center of power, the 
Sudanese Government had done all that it could to block 
scrutiny of its human rights performance and had terrorized 
Sudanese who attempted to report human rights violations to 
U.N. observers.82  
   Had Turabi tried to convince his fellow Islamists that 
it was essential to respect democratic freedoms and to 
incorporate firm guarantees for human rights in their 
program, his subsequent efforts to obtain for himself the 
benefit of international human rights protections would not 
seem so much a product of crass selfishness and gross 
double standards.  Given his track record, Sudanese had to 
assume that Turabi actually did not have any belief that 
human rights applied universally. They had reason worry 
whether, if this ambitious Islamist again had the 
opportunity, Turabi would try once more to impose a 
ruthless Islamization agenda that would torpedo the 
compromises envisaged under the tentative peace accords 
reached in 2005 between North and South.     
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    Unlike Turabi, whose appeals to the U.N. human rights 
system have been cynical and opportunistic, Shirin Ebadi, 
Iran’s Nobel Laureate, has followed a coherent philosophy 
of human rights universalism.  In fighting to advance 
respect for international human rights law in the dangerous 
and oppressive Iranian environment, Ebadi has repeatedly 
put her own life on the line to stand up for the human 
rights of others.  However, as already mentioned, she is 
also ready to condemn Western violations, speaking out to 
decry U.S. non-compliance. In her tough Nobel acceptance 
speech she denounced the lack of respect for international 
human rights law on the part of both Iran and the United 
States.  Among other things, she said: 
 
The concerns of human rights advocates increase when they 
observe that international human rights laws are breached 
not only by their recognized opponents under the pretext of 
cultural relativity, but that these principles are also 
violated in Western democracies, in other words countries 
which were themselves among the initial codifiers of the 
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. It is in this framework that, for months, 
hundreds of individuals who were arrested in the course of 
military conflicts have been imprisoned in Guantanamo, 
without the benefit of the rights stipulated under the 
international Geneva conventions, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the [United Nations] International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.83  
Even more embarrassing for the second Bush Administration, 
which tries to convince a skeptical world that its 
interventionist policies in the Middle East are driven by 
its altruistic devotion to human rights ideals, Ebadi 
publicly denounced the projected U.S. attack on Iran as one 
that would degrade rather than enhance Iranians’ rights.84 
Her outspoken condemnations of U.S. policy show the wrong 
headedness of charges that upholding the universality of 
human rights necessarily correlates with backing for 
Western plots to subjugate Muslims.  
 Reinforcing the logic of strong support for 
universalism and underlining the fallacious nature of 
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appeals to Islamic exceptionalism, a new book of haunting 
images drawn by Sudanese torture victims depicting the 
horrific abuses in the Bashir regime’s torture chambers has 
appeared.85 For all who have seen the stomach-turning 
photographs of the tortures inflicted on Iraqi prisoners in 
Abu Ghraib and the drawings that detainees recently 
released from Guantanamo have made of the abuses that they 
were forced to endure, the similarities in the horrors 
depicted will be striking. Whether carried out by the 
minions of Sudan’s Islamist dictatorship or inflicted by 
the U.S. military in prisons in Iraq and Cuba, these cruel 
assaults on human dignity help us to appreciate how the 
religious affiliations and nationalities of the 
perpetrators and the victims count for nothing.  
  Another factor to consider as one considers the 
judgments passed on U.S. mistreatment of detainees is how 
credibility depends on the consistent use of human rights 
standards. Human rights NGOs like Human Rights Watch that 
follow policies of human rights universalism have the 
ability to make credible critiques of the human rights 
violations attendant on the U.S. “war” on terrorism.86  
Conversely, parties like Turabi or Iran’s ruling theocrats, 
who are not consistent in their own applications of human 
rights standards, cannot expect their critiques to carry 
any weight. 
     Like the authors of the UDHR, those of us who feel 
genuine concern for the sufferings of our fellow humans 
need to move from our revulsion at “barbarous acts which 
have outraged the conscience of mankind” to upholding “a 
common understanding” of the rights and freedoms needed to 
protect human rights and the rule of law. And we need to 






                                                 
85 See Coping with Torture: Images from the Sudan, Osman 
Fadl and Ann M. Lesch, eds. (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, 
2004). 
86 See e.g., Human Rights Watch, Guantanamo: Detainee Accounts 
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/gitmo1004/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
